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ABSTRACT
This paper explores whether and how contentious stakeholders can disrupt a firm’s non-market
strategy. We offer the first systematic study of the effect of public protest on corporate political
activity, using a unique database that allows us to empirically analyze the impact of social
movement boycotts on targeted firms’ campaign contributions. We show that boycotts lead to
significant reductions in the amount of targets’ campaign contributions and increase the
proportion of contributions that politicians refund. These results highlight the importance of
considering how a firm’s socio-political environment shapes its non-market strategy. We
supplement this primary analysis by drawing from social movement theory to extrapolate and
test a number of mechanisms that moderate the extent to which movement challenges effectively
disrupt corporate political activity.
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Blacklisted Benefactors: The Political Contestation of Non-Market Strategy

Firms exist in multiple institutional environments, requiring interaction with myriad
audiences who often have conflicting expectations and demands (Scott, 1987; Greenwood,
2011). One of the most critical of these audiences is the state, which crafts the rules of the game
that define market competition and creates the system of laws and punishments that comprise the
formal, regulatory pillar of firms’ institutional environments (Scott, 2001). Though legal rules
certainly constrain corporate behavior, firms do not passively acquiesce to the iron cage of their
regulatory institutions. Rather, work at the intersection of strategy and organization theory
provides ample evidence that firms employ a battery of tactics to manage political uncertainty
and influence regulatory outcomes (e.g., Fligstein, 1996; Hirsch, 1975; Dunbar & Wasilewski,
1985; Edelman, Uggen, & Erlanger, 1999; Rao, Yue, & Ingram, 2011; Marquis & Qian, 2014).
The broader literature collectively refers to this tactical repertoire as a firm’s non-market
strategy.
A particularly prolific stream of research in non-market strategy explores corporate
political activity, or the pursuit of legislative and regulatory influence through tactics like
campaign contributions and lobbying (de Figueiredo, 2009; Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 2004; de
Figueiredo & Silverman, 2006; Bonardi & Keim, 2005; Hadani & Schuler, 2012; Weymouth,
2012). This work has primarily sought to identify the factors that determine the use and efficacy
of political activity. Political scientists, economists, and management scholars have highlighted
firm- and industry-level heterogeneity as important predictors of political activity, pointing to
factors like firm size, liquid capital, industry concentration, and the extent of industry regulation
(e.g., Grier et al., 1994; Hillman, 2003; Macher et al., 2011; Macher & Mayo, 2012; Weymouth,
2012). Economic sociologists have provided evidence that political activity is also shaped by the
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dense social networks that connect organizations and the managerial elite (e.g., Mizruchi, 1989;
1992; Burris, 2005). And scholars drawing from organizational theory have pointed to
differences in culture and behavioral norms as other likely institutional determinants of the
business-government interface (Hillman & Keim, 1995).
Despite this rich, interdisciplinary attention to corporate political activity, we continue to
know little about how a company’s reputation affects its ability to engage in political strategy
and influence regulatory stakeholders. This theoretical gap is surprising given the intimate role
that reputational concerns appear to play in the political process. After all, despite its ubiquity,
corporate political activity is a contentious subject that draws widespread media coverage and
public opprobrium, especially given steady declines since the 1970s in public approval of the
role of business in American politics (Smith, 2000). As social actors, government officials strive
to build and protect their legitimacy in order to wield and exercise power within their own social
field (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Skocpol, 1985; Suchman, 1995; King, Felin & Whetten, 2010;
Hiatt & Park, 2013; Werner, 2014). Individual regulators are especially sensitive to threats to
their legitimacy because of their continuous, substantial reliance on support from external
constituencies (Carpenter, 2001), and elected officials, with their focus on reelection, are
similarly cautious. Thus, reputational threats appear likely to adversely affect firms’ ability to
effectively engage in political activity.
In this paper, we explore this possibility by employing organizational and social
movement theory as a lens to understand the relationship between reputational threats and
political activity. We propose that non-market strategy is politically contested, meaning that a
firm’s non-market strategy can be disrupted when contentious stakeholders question the
legitimacy of a firm’s practices, policies, or products. To test this general proposition, we offer
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the first systematic study of the effect of public protest on corporate political activity, using a
unique database that allows us to empirically analyze the impact of social movement boycotts on
targeted firms’ campaign contributions through their affiliated political action committees
(PACs). Results from our analyses confirm that boycotts lead to significant reductions in the
amount of targets’ campaign contributions. Moreover, we show that boycotts lead to a
significant increase in the proportion of targeted firms’ contributions that are refunded, thereby
being effectively rejected by the politicians they seek to support. These results highlight the
important role that the socio-political environment in which a firm is embedded plays in
determining firms’ freedom to strategically interact with their regulatory environment. We
supplement this primary analysis by drawing from social movement theory to extrapolate and
test a number of mechanisms that moderate the extent to which movement challenges disrupt
corporate political activity.

Background and Theory: Movements and the Disruption of Non-market Strategy
Work at the nexus of social movement theory and organizational theory explores the
increasing prevalence of activist movements that directly target market-based actors to press for
changes in corporate products, practices and policies. Although social activists occupy positions
of ostensibly little power or authority within the corporate field, they are nonetheless often able
to capture the attention of corporate managers and successfully achieve their goals by using
contentious tactics like boycotts, protests, and negative media campaigns (King and Pearce,
2011). Recent research suggests that positive outcomes primarily accrue to social movements
that are able to use these tactics to disrupt their target’s strategic activity (King, 2011). In
practice, this disruption takes many forms. Early work in the area focused on protestors’

Blacklisted Benefactors

5

disruption of firms’ competitive strategy through increasing costs, decreasing consumer demand,
and interrupting targets’ routines and supply chain processes (Cress & Snow, 2000; Gamson,
1990; Luders, 2006; Piven & Cloward, 1977; Rojas, 2006; Seidman, 2007; Luders, 2006; Baron
& Diermeier, 2002). More recent work suggests that activist challenges additionally disrupt their
targets’ financial market position and social management process, prompting analyst downgrades
(Vasi & King, 2012), spurring investor divestment (Soule, 2009; Soule, Swaminathan, &
Tihanyi, 2013), and threatening a firm’s public image and reputation (King, 2008; McDonnell &
King, 2013; King & McDonnell, 2014).
Despite this considerable body of work exploring the multi-faceted mechanisms through
which social movements disrupt their corporate targets, there has been no systematic study of
whether and how contentious activists disrupt their targets’ political strategy. Recent work does,
however, provide preliminary evidence that non-market stakeholders attend to and are influenced
by market contention. For example, Ingram and Rao (2004), in their study of anti-chain-store
laws in the United States, suggest that activists use political strategies of their own to vie with
incumbent firms for regulatory influence. Ingram, Yue, and Rao (2010) provide complementary
evidence that firms interpret public protest as a signal of hostile non-market environments with
higher regulatory costs. Most recently, Hiatt and Park (2013) argue that regulatory agents
interpret public protests as signals of legitimacy risks. Analyzing a sample of petitions for
approval of genetically modified plant products, they found that public protests brought against
products significantly decreased the likelihood of regulatory approval. Further, they provide
evidence that protests caused regulators to rely more heavily on external signals of legitimacy,
like the support of powerful industry stakeholders. These results suggest that regulators are
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likely to conclude that companies targeted with higher levels of activism possess compromised
legitimacy, which gives rise to a less receptive regulatory environment.
We supplement this prior work by directly exploring the question of whether and how
corporate-targeted protest disrupts firms’ political strategy. We contend that activist campaigns
produce valuable signals of stakeholders’ perceptions of an organization that are useful to
politicians, just as prior work has suggested they are to investors (King & Soule, 2007), analysts
(Vasi & King, 2013), and the targeted organizations themselves (Ingram et al., 2010). Social
protests bring an organization’s reputation and social approval into question. Politicians, we
argue, are likely to interpret these reputational threats as indicative of greater associative risk,
which we define as the politicians’ perceived likelihood of accruing incidental damage by virtue
of their mere association with a reputationally compromised organization (Pontikes, Negro, &
Rao, 2010). If we make the uncontroversial assumptions that elected officials are reelection
focused and risk averse (Mayhew, 1974), then associative risk should decrease policymakers’
willingness to establish a public connection to a firm, due to the threat that it will lead to
negative publicity and adverse electoral consequences. Indeed, prior political science research
has established that elected officials are less responsive to firms when they believe that being
associated with the firm or its policy positions will heighten electoral risks (Smith, 2000). Thus,
by threatening their targets’ reputations (King, 2008; McDonnell & King, 2013), social
movement challenges are likely to reduce politicians’ willingness to establish public ties with the
targeted company. In this way, social movement challengers can disrupt their targets’ access to
non-market strategic options.
Social protest is likely to disrupt visible non-market strategic tactics like corporate
campaign contributions through two distinct channels. First, firms that are targeted by social
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activists may anticipate that politicians will be less willing to bear the enhanced risk of
associating with them. These firms are also motivated to avoid the additional reputational
damage they would incur if politicians publically rejected their contributions. Targeted firms
may, therefore, voluntarily reduce their political contributions in the wake of an activist
challenge or other reputational threat. Democratic Texas Representative Charlie Gonzalez
explicitly articulated this logic just after the BP Horizon explosion in the Gulf of Mexico, saying,
“It makes good sense on everyone's part for a company PAC to suspend campaign money during
a period of scrutiny…” (Levinthal, 2012). This leads to our first hypothesis:

H1: Firms that are targeted with boycotts will reduce their overall level of political contributions,
relative to firms that are not boycotted.

The second way in which social protest disrupts corporate campaign contributions is by
increasing the likelihood that politicians will refund the contributions that they receive from
targeted firms. Insofar as social movement challenges are interpreted as signals of reduced
social approval and increased associative risk, politicians’ risk aversion should lead them to be
reluctant to keep contributions that they receive from recently targeted companies. Anecdotal
evidence abounds to support the more general link between firms’ reputational crises and the
associative risk borne by politicians with whom they are publically connected. For example, just
after the Securities and Exchange Commission filed a lawsuit accusing Goldman Sachs of
deceiving its investors, the media produced a veritable laundry list of the politicians who had
benefitted from Goldman’s support, each of which was being publically challenged by opponents
to “do the proper thing” and return the contributions (Mullins & Spencer, 2010). Goldman’s
reputational damage essentially risked spilling over to the politicians who maintained their
affiliation with the firm, as those who refused to return Goldman’s contributions chanced being
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perceived as either complicit in or approving of its behavior. To avoid spillover damage to their
own reputations – as well as the adverse electoral consequences of such damage -- politicians
receiving money from reputationally compromised firms are more likely to cut ties by shunning
the company’s support. We can formally state this as:

H2: The proportion of political contributions that are refunded to the contributing firm will
increase for firms that are targeted by boycotts, relative to firms that are not boycotted.

Importantly, while H1 captures firms’ assessments of the likelihood that their political
contributions will be successful, H2 hones in on our proposed mechanism of associative risk by
examining how social protest affects the willingness of politicians to establish or maintain a
public connection with a given firm. Further, we believe that this hypothesis offers a particularly
conservative test of our hypotheses for two reasons. First, in light of our prior prediction that
firms targeted by social movements will be more cautious about making contributions because of
their fear of public rejection, any effect we observe in the refunded amounts is likely an
understatement of the amount that would have been refunded if targeted companies continued to
contribute at their pre-boycott levels. Additionally, given the tremendous resource expenditures
required for a political campaign, politicians are typically very reticent to refund the corporate
contributions that they receive. This sentiment has colored the judicial interpretation of federal
election law, as indicated in the Supreme Court’s statement that “[t]he major evil associated with
rapidly increasing campaign expenditures is the danger of candidate dependence on large
contributions” (Buckley v. Valeo, 1976). A prominent Republican lobbyist more colorfully
illustrated this notion to one of the authors when he was describing the political situation of one
of his more controversial client-firms, saying, “Do you know how much [this firm] was hated by
the Democrats? They wouldn’t take its political money. That is a sentence usually reserved for
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child molesters and prisoners.” Further, as average amounts of election expenditures increase
with time, so too will the pressure for politicians to keep the corporate contributions they receive,
regardless of their benefactor’s character. All of this amounts to a likely bias against observable
disruptions in refunded PAC contributions over time.
Because we see changes in the proportion of refunds as a more direct test of our
overarching theory of disruption through increased associative risk, we focus on this aspect of
disruption in teasing out potential moderating mechanisms below.

Moderating Mechanisms
Past work suggests that contentious activist challenges vary markedly in the extent to
which they produce a viable threat to their target’s reputation, which leads to systematic
differences in targeted firm’s direct and indirect responses (King, 2008; McDonnell and King,
2013). Some boycotts go largely unnoticed, whereas others may erupt into large-scale
organizational crises for the targeted firm. We suggest that boycotts that provoke more
reputational threat are likely to also provoke larger increases in associative risk and, as a
consequence, more significant disruptions to the target’s ability to access and influence political
stakeholders.
King’s (2008) political mediation model suggests that the reputational threat produced by
a social movement challenge depends on the movement’s mobilized resources as well as the
characteristics of the targeted firm. Below, we extend this model to the present setting, drawing
from past work in social movement theory to tease out the characteristics of boycotts and
targeted firms that are likely to moderate the perceived associative risk attendant to a contentious
challenge. Additionally, recent work suggests that a targeted firm’s defensive response to a
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contentious challenge may ameliorate the extent to which its reputation suffers in the wake of a
challenge (McDonnell & King, 2013; McDonnell, King, and Soule, 2014; McDonnell, 2014).
Drawing from this work, we supplement the political mediation model with a discussion of how
targets’ defensive responses may moderate the disruption of their political strategy.

Characteristics of the Boycott
Our first proposed moderator of reputational threat is the amount of media attention that a
boycott receives. Past research has shown that social movements that generate more media
attention represent greater threats to their target (King, 2008; 2011; McDonnell & King, 2013).
Media attention legitimizes activists’ challenges and assists activists in mobilizing broad
audience support (Koopmans & Olzak, 2004). We contend that regulatory stakeholders are also
likely to notice boycotts that attract more media attention and recognize them as legitimate
signals of stakeholder disapproval, leading to increases in associative risk. This suggests:

H3a: Boycotts that receive more media attention will be more likely to lead to increases in the
proportion of refunded contributions.

A second moderator of reputational threat is the salience of the issue that is advocated by
activists. Social movement theory suggests that activists primarily use contentious tactics to
“problematize” a given issue for the public (Benford & Snow, 2000; King 2008; Maguire &
Hardy, 2009). That is, activists use protest tactics to draw attention to an issue about which the
public is largely ignorant or indifferent, seeking to re-frame it in a way that the public will find
problematic in order to mobilize support for the activists’ reform agenda. Of course, there is
wide variance in the types of issues that the public perceives as being most problematic at any
given time. Issues must also to some extent compete; it is difficult to rouse the public’s support
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for costly environmental reform, for example, when the economy is faltering. Given constraints
on their own time and attention, we also expect politicians to focus most keenly on the most
salient issues, those that the public currently perceives as being most important. When activists
raise concerns about issues that the general public believes to be important, politicians are, in
turn, more likely to infer that an association with the firm could risk threatening constituent
support, increasing perceived associative risk. Thus:

H3b: Boycotts advocating more salient issues will be more likely to lead to increases in the
proportion of refunded contributions.
The extent to which activists can disrupt a corporation’s non-market strategy may
additionally depend on which point the activists target within the organization’s structure, or the
structural locus of attack. Often, when firms possess a portfolio that includes potentially
controversial brands, they will adopt subsidiary structures that compartmentalize these brands in
order to buffer the parent and other brands from the reputational damage associated with the
problematic product. For example, Limited Companies has in its history owned both
Abercrombie and Fitch and Victoria’s Secret, both of which share a storied past with social
activists due to controversial product offerings and marketing strategies. But Limited
Companies is also the parent of less-controversial retail outlets like Bath and Body Works.
Because Limited Companies’ structure separates each of its holdings into independently operated
and branded retail units, Limited reduces the extent to which an activist challenge against
controversial brands like Victoria’s Secret will spill over and affect sales of products within less
controversial brands like Bath and Body Works.
Activists that contest problematic branded products must make the strategic decision of
whether to aim their attack at the parent or the subsidiary. Activists may directly target a specific
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brand or subsidiary because it is the most immediate source of the contested problem or because
they themselves do not know of the brand’s ultimate owner. For example, in 2013 parent
activists made no mention of Limited Brands or its associated holdings when calling for a
boycott of Victoria’s Secret for allegedly marketing its new ‘Bright Young Things’ line to
middle-school aged girls (ABC News, 2013). However, direct attacks against the parent may be
more likely to capture the attention of the managers at the highest orders of a conglomerate’s
structural hierarchy, and the managers of subsidiaries may have less discretion to respond to the
activists’ demands (King, 2008). For example, when the Coalition of Immokalee Workers
waged a multi-year campaign protesting the exploitative conditions that Taco Bell offered to the
indigenous peoples hired to pick its tomatoes, the Coalition directly named Taco Bell’s parent,
Yum! Brands, as its target. Ultimately, it was the managers of Yum! Brands that conceded to the
Immokalee’s demands by signing the Fair Food agreement in March of 2005 (Coalition of
Immokalee Workers, 2014). The managers of the Taco Bell subsidiary likely lacked the
requisite power to make the concessions provided in the agreement.
Because the parent company typically determines a firm’s overall political strategy, the
locus of attack is also likely to affect the extent to which an activist challenge causes a
discernable disruption in strategy. When activists target one brand or subsidiary, the parent
company may be shielded from reputational damage, as politicians and members of the public
may not be aware of the parent’s affiliation with the challenged brands. Attacks directly against
the parent, however, may increase potential reputational damage by threatening all of a
conglomerate’s holdings simultaneously. Politicians and members of the public are also more
likely to associate a challenge with a parent company when the challenge is brought against the
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parent company itself. Thus, challenges against a parent are likely to provoke greater associative
risk than challenges against subsidiaries.

H3c: Boycotts against parent companies will be more likely to lead to increases in the proportion
of refunded contributions.

Characteristics of the Target
One particularly important firm-level determinant of reputational risk is a firm’s position
within its field, defined as the “socially constructed arena[] within which actors with varying
resource endowments vie for the advantage” (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012). Firms with higher
status within their field hierarchy benefit from more “subjective ‘standing’” than their peer
organizations, from which they derive more robust reputations, prestige, and power (2012).
Prior work suggests that reputable firms benefit from an increased ‘benefit of the doubt’
afforded to them by their stakeholders when they are embroiled in a crisis or scandal (Fombrun,
1996; McDonnell & King, 2014). Insofar as high field positions are concomitant with higher
reputations and esteem, firms occupying more estimable positions within their field are likely to
benefit from this ‘halo effect.’ Like other stakeholders, politicians are likely to interpret
challenges in a light more favorable to the targeted firm when the firm has a higher reputation.
In turn, we expect challenges against firms with higher reputations to provoke lower perceptions
of increased associative risk.

H4a: Boycotts against lower status firms will be more likely to lead to increases in the
proportion of refunded contributions.

Regulated firms are typically viewed as being more sensitive to the political process
(Masters & Keim, 1985), and thus, they contribute more on average through their affiliated
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PACs than firms in unregulated industries (Grier et al., 1994). One consequence of this higher
level of political engagement is that politicians, through these firms’ political activities, as well
as their own oversight of these firms’ industries, have more information about this subset of
firms. In turn, this higher level of information likely leads politicians to have more fixed
perceptions of regulated firms that are harder for market activists to disrupt. In contrast,
politicians lack information about unregulated firms. As a result, politicians’ perceptions of
unregulated firms’ reputations may be more vulnerable to disruption by market activists, making
politicians more likely to distance themselves in the face of signals of associative risk. Thus, we
hypothesize that:

H4b: Boycotts against firms in unregulated industries will be more likely to lead to increases in
the proportion of refunded contributions.
Target’s Defensive Response
Firms may additionally be able to reduce associative risk in the wake of a social
movement challenge by engaging in non-market strategies that provide signals that bolster their
reputations and restore social approval. As one Congressman remarked to the press, “What I
look for is whether the company is accountable for its mistake, assumes responsibility and takes
substantive measures to correct it. Then I'll make a decision about accepting support”
(Levinthal, 2012). As this quotation makes clear, the actions that a firm takes to manage stigma
in the wake of an activist challenge can affect whether political actors continue to be willing to
associate with a firm. We explore two potential strategic responses that companies may take to
ameliorate the threat of reputational damage in the wake of a boycott: pro-social claims and
direct concession.
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In a study of firm’s responses to consumer boycotts, McDonnell and King (2013) provide
evidence that many firms respond defensively to protect their reputation after an activist
challenge by using increased pro-social claims, or “public expressions of the organization’s
commitment to socially acceptable norms, beliefs, and activities.” Pro-social claims operate to
reduce reputational threat by flooding the media with positive images of a firm that dilute the
negative claims made by challengers. Because associative risk is predicated on signals of
reputational red flags, this type of post-threat impression management should also reduce
perceived associative risk within the nonmarket environment by diluting the salience of negative
information about the firm. This leads to the hypothesis that:

H5a: Boycotts against firms that engage in less post-threat impression management will be more
likely to lead to increases in the proportion of refunded contributions.

A more direct way in which firms can react to ameliorate the reputational threat of an
activist challenge is to concede to the activists’ demands. In an empirical investigation of the
factors leading to corporate concessions to boycotts, King (2008) provided evidence that
corporations are more likely to concede when the boycotts provoke an image threat or when the
firm’s reputation is otherwise vulnerable. Although the direct question of whether concession
does indeed quell the reputational threat portended by a contentious challenge is not examined,
King’s (2008) study suggests that firms are provoked to concede as a defensive play to protect an
imperiled public image. For politicians with whom activists’ challenges resonate, concession
may be taken as a signal that a firm is taking appropriate steps to rectify a reputational
vulnerability, reducing the extent to which the activist challenge is interpreted as a signal of
enduring associative risk. This suggests:
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H5b: Boycotts against firms that do not concede to activists’ demands will be more likely to lead
to increases in the proportion of refunded contributions.

Data and Analysis
Boycott Sample Construction
We test our hypotheses with a unique, self-constructed database that allows us to track
the political campaign contributions and refunded contributions of public companies that are the
targets of social movement boycotts. To build our sample of boycotted firms, we performed a
manual content analysis of the six largest US newspapers from 1990 to 2007. The newspapers
mined for our sample include the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal,
Chicago Tribune, USA Today and Los Angeles Times, which provides variation in geographical
and substantive focus, as well as editorial page ideology. Using the Factiva, Proquest, and
Lexis-nexis databases, coders began by searching the past text of these newspapers for all
instances of articles mentioning the words “boycott,” “boycotted,” “boycotts,” or “boycotting.”
In order to limit the sample to publically traded firms for which financial data was available at
the time of the boycott, coders then matched the targeted firms with company-specific quarterly
and yearly financial data from COMPUSTAT. In total, the dataset includes 213 distinct boycott
events targeting a total of 253 firms.1 Full financial data in the period surrounding the boycott
were not available for 50 of the targeted firms, reducing the final sample to 203 boycott-target
observations.

1

Only one of the 213 distinct boycotts we identify directly relates to corporate political activity, which is
unsurprising given that corporate PACs, as access-oriented actors, overwhelmingly give to incumbent politicians
rather than only members of one party. The remaining boycotts arise due to corporate practices or events that are
exogenous to political activity. Including or excluding the one boycott related to political activity from our sample
does not affect our substantive or statistical conclusions.
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Our approach continues an established tradition in social movement scholarship of using
archival newspaper data to identify instances of social movement tactics (e.g., McAdam & Su,
2002; Earl, Soule, & McCarthy, 2003; Earl, Martin, Soule, & McCarthy, 2004; Van Dyke, Soule,
& Taylor, 2004; King, 2008; McDonnell & King, 2013; McDonnell, King, & Soule, 2014).
Because of its prevalence, the limitations of this method are also well understood and thoroughly
discussed in prior work (Oliver & Myers, 1999; Oliver & Maney, 2000; Earl et al., 2004; Ortiz,
Myers, Walls, & Diaz, 2005). For our purposes, use of newspaper media archives presents
potential sampling problems that deserve mention here. Past work suggests that newspapers are
not fully objective when deciding which movements to cover. For example, they may prefer to
include stories about boycotts waging more interesting issues, or those against large, reputable,
‘celebrity’ firms that are more likely to pique the interest of their readers (e.g., King &
McDonnell, 2014). Thus, it is possible that some boycott events occur but do not receive any
newspaper coverage. We would posit, however, that it is unlikely that politicians or targeted
companies will be aware of these unreported boycotts. Because we are ultimately interested in
how boycotts affect corporate and politician decision-making, conditioning our sample to
boycotts reported in major media outlets allows us to better assure that companies and politicians
were actually aware of activists’ claims, justifying our use of boycotts as an exogenous shock
that affects the behavior of politicians and targeted firms.

Matched Sample Construction
Our first two hypotheses hold that a boycott event will decrease the amount of a targeted
firm’s gross campaign contributions and increase the proportion of refunded contributions. In
order to establish our causal claim, we constructed a quasi-control group of matched, nonboycotted firms so that we could employ a difference-in-differences approach to compare the
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matched sample’s PAC contributions and refunds in the pre- and post-treatment period with that
of our boycotted sample. This quasi-experimental approach allows us to more confidently infer
causality by showing not only that being the target of a boycott correlates with changes in
campaign contributions and refunds in the direction we expect but that the patterns we observe
for boycotted firms are significantly different than those observed for similar firms that were not
boycotted.
We constructed our sample of non-boycotted control firms using coarsened exact
matching to match each firm to another firm in the same SIC two-digit industry category with the
most similar size (by assets) and status (by ranking in Fortune magazine’s annual ranking of the
‘Most Admired Companies’). We exact-matched based on industry because the likelihood of
regulation – and, accordingly, a company’s incentives for participating in political activity –
varies systematically by industry (Schuler, Rehbein, & Cramer 2002). We additionally match
based on size and status because these variables have been shown repeatedly to be important
predictors of the likelihood of being boycotted (e.g., King, 2008; McDonnell & King, 2013;
King & McDonnell, 2014). By including these variables, we aimed to construct a control sample
that was at a similar risk of being boycotted as the treatment sample, so as to reduce the chance
that sampling bias explains the observed differences between our treatment and control firms.
This helps us to meet the underlying assumption of differences-in-differences analysis that, but
for their exposure to the treatment, the treated sample would behave like the matched set, and
vice versa. Ultimately, we are left with a 1:1 matched set, including 203 boycotted firms and
203 matches.

Dependent Variables
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The data for our dependent variables come from the Federal Election Commission (FEC).
We employed the FEC’s transaction-level data for corporate PACs. By way of background,
PACs are separate legal funds that are segregated from their affiliated firms’ general treasuries.
The money raised by corporate PACs must come from a restricted class of individuals that
includes the top management team, classified employees, and shareholders, as well as the
spouses of these individuals. The affiliated firm may only pay for the operating expenses of the
PAC (e.g., filing expenses). Individuals can contribute up to $5,000 per calendar year to the
PAC, and the PAC can contribute up to $5,000 per candidate per election, with primary and
general elections counting separately. When an individual contributes money to a PAC, the
individual cannot be remunerated for their contribution by the firm, no money can flow back to
the individual from the PAC, and the PAC’s leadership has control over the contribution process.
These last two points are key, as once the money enters the PAC it takes on the sponsoring
firm’s identity and name, even though the money originated from individuals.
Each quarter, the FEC requires PACs to report transaction-level records of their activity,
including amounts refunded, for any transaction greater than $200. We aggregate these data into
quarterly data by simply summing the relevant collected data (e.g., amount contributed) by PAC
and then generating additional indicators, as needed (e.g., proportion refunded = total refunds /
total non-netted contributions). Although the FEC requires corporate-linked PACs to list their
connected organizations, i.e., the corporation they are connected to, the FEC’s data does not
provide a link between their data sets and any standard firm unique identifier. Thus, we matched
firms and PACs by hand, and in the few cases in which a firm had multiple linked PACs, we
aggregated contributions across all of these PACs in each quarter. From this sample, we derive
the two dependent variables utilized to test our hypotheses. To test hypothesis 1, our dependent
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variable is the total amount of federal campaign contributions made from PACs affiliated with a
given firm in a given quarter. To test hypotheses 2-5, our dependent variable is the proportion
of total federal campaign contributions made from affiliated PACs that were reported as
refunded, indicating that they were rejected by the recipient politicians.2

Treatment Indicators and the Difference-in-Differences Model Specification
We test our hypotheses through a series of difference-in-differences analyses. In these
analyses, the critical independent variable is referred to as a difference estimator. The difference
estimator captures a treatment effect by measuring whether the dependent variable changed at a
significantly different rate for the treated group (here, the boycotted companies), as compared to
the control group (here, our matched sample). To model the difference estimator within the
difference-in-differences analysis testing H1, we transformed our data into a panel dataset where
the unit of analysis is the firm-quarter. Each of the 203 boycotted firms and 203 matched firms
are observed twice in the dataset: once in the pre-treatment quarter and once in the posttreatment quarter, resulting in a total of 812 observations. To illustrate, if a firm was the target
of a boycott in May of 2010, both it and its match from the non-boycotted sample would be
observed in the first and third quarters of 2010.
Because the dependent variable, total amount of campaign contributions, is a continuous
variable, we employ ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, with standard errors clustered by
company-event. The models include a period variable (coded “0” before the boycott event and
“1” after the boycott event) and a treatment variable (coded “1” for boycotted firms and “0” for
the matched firms). The difference estimator is the interaction of the period and treatment

2

To ensure that the refunds we observe resulted from politicians refunding PAC contributions, we examined
transaction-level data to rule out the possibility that these refunds resulted from a legal violation, such as the firmlinked PAC contributing beyond the allowed legal limit in that election cycle.
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variables. This variable tests whether the change in the dependent variable differs significantly
between the treatment and matched samples, allowing us to explore whether the boycott event is
the underlying cause of observed changes in the amount of PAC contributions made by targeted
firms.
Our models testing changes in the proportion of refunded contributions (H2-5) are
similarly constructed, with all firms observed in the pre- and post-treatment periods. However,
the proportion refunded dependent variable differs from total contributions dependent variable
because, as a proportion, it is bounded between 0 and 1. Using a proportion in a standard linear
regression model such as the OLS to test H2-5 may yield impossible predictions when the
dependent variable approaches its minimum and maximum. Thus, in our refund model, we
employ the approach developed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996), which uses a logit
transformation implemented via a generalized linear model to ensure that predictions of our
dependent variable are strictly bound between 0 and 1.
To test hypotheses 3-5, we broke the treatment group into sub-samples which we
separately interacted with the period variable to derive independent difference estimators.

First,

to examine whether the treatment effect differed by the media attention attracted by the boycott,
we collected all articles from the six largest US newspapers related to the boycotts in our sample
and summed the total number of articles written about each boycott. The amount of media
attention ranged from 1 article to 18 articles with a mean of 1.77. The large majority of our
sample (70%) only appeared in the media once: on the day of its initial announcement. We then
broke the treatment sample into two separate treatments: boycotts with more media attention and
boycotts with less media attention. The more media attention treatment is coded 1 for all
treatment firms that was covered in more than one article and the less media attention treatment
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is coded as 1 for all treatment firms for which the initial boycott announcement was the sole
coverage. We independently calculated the difference estimator for these sub-samples by
separately interacting each with the period variable, as described above.
We measured the salience of the boycotter’s claims by using data from Gallup’s ‘Most
Important Problem’ poll. Gallup conducts this poll quarterly on a randomized sample of
American voters who are asked open-endedly to name “the most important problem facing this
country today.” The data report each individual problem that was listed, along with the
proportion of polled individuals who chose it. In the first quarter of 2014, for example, the most
often cited problems were unemployment, government dissatisfaction, and the general economy,
and lesser cited problems included abortion, gun control, and corporate corruption. In total, 47
distinct problems were cited during this quarter. Using these data, we sorted the treatment
sample into two groups: higher issue salience and lower issue salience. Treated firms were
sorted into the higher issue salience group if the issue being waged in the boycott was among
those reported in the ‘Most Important Problem’ poll. All other treated firms were sorted into the
lower issue salience category.
To explore whether the treatment effect differed by locus of attack for treated firms, we
split the treatment sample into two categories: parent and subsidiary. The parent category was
coded as 1 for all boycotts waged against a parent company, and 0 otherwise. The subsidiary
category was coded as 1 for all boycotts waged against a subsidiary, and 0 otherwise. Again, we
independently calculated the difference estimator for these sub-samples by separately interacting
each with the period variable.
To explore whether the treatment effect differed by the status of treated firms, we split
the treatment sample into two categories: high status and low status. As a proxy for corporate

Blacklisted Benefactors

23

status, we used Fortune magazine’s annual ‘Most Admired Companies’ index. The Fortune
‘Most Admired’ index is a ranking of corporate prestige based on surveys of the executives of an
organization’s peer firms (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Bermiss, Zajac, & King, 2013). The
rankings are also a popular proxy for corporate status and prestige (Roberts & Dowling, 2002;
King, 2008; Pfarrer, Pollock & Rindova, 2010; McDonnell & King, 2013), representing “the
most widely used in the empirical research arena” (Sabate & Puente, 2003). Firms are ranked on
a scale ranging from 0 to 10 and those firms scoring the highest within their industry are reported
in the annual ‘Most Admired Companies’ list. The rankings have a natural one-year lag, being
based on surveys collected in the prior year. We sorted targeted firms into the high status
category if they were listed in the Fortune index in the year of the boycott and into the low status
category if they were not. We then calculated difference estimators for each of these categories
by independently interacting them with the period variable.
To examine whether the treatment effect differed by whether the boycotted firm was in a
regulated industry, we split the treatment sample into two categories: regulated industry and
unregulated industry. We sorted firms into the regulated or unregulated industry category using
the classification by two-digit SIC code provided in prior work (Weiss & Klass, 1986; Danos &
Eichenseher, 1982; Hogan & Jeter, 1999). We independently calculated the difference estimator
by separately interacting each category with the period variable.
To examine whether the treatment effect differs by a firm’s post-boycott impression
management, we collected data on all firm’s pro-social claims in the six months following a
boycott announcement. Using Factiva’s major PR newswires database, we searched for all press
releases issued by a targeted firm in the six months after a boycott’s announcement. We then
read through each result and identified examples of pro-social claims, or communicated claims
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of corporate social actions that extend beyond the direct transactional interests of the firm to aid
the firm’s external stakeholders or communities (McDonnell & King, 2013; Marquis et al.,
2007). Using this data, we split the treatment sample into two categories: high impression
management and low impression management. The low impression management category is
coded “1” for all targeted firms that did not issue any prosocial claims in the six months
following the boycott, while the high impression management category is coded “1” for all
targeted firms that issued one or more prosocial claim in the six months after the boycott. We
independently calculated the difference estimator for these sub-samples by separately interacting
each with the period variable.
Finally, to test whether the difference estimator varies by concession, we split the
treatment sample into two categories, concession and no concession, which are each binary
variables capturing whether a targeted firm conceded to the boycotters’ demands. Following
King (2008), a concession was defined in the coding process as “a recognition by the corporation
of the boycotters’ demands and a public expression of conformity to those demands.” To
identify when a concession occurred, we searched for and read all additional newspaper coverage
of the boycotts in our sample. Our coding scheme rests on the assumption that corporations that
intend to concede to activists will do so publically, given that activists’ challenges are launched
in the public arena. Targeted firms in our sample conceded about 23% of the time, which is
similar to the concession rate found in prior samples of boycotted firms (e.g., Friedman, 1985:
26%; King, 2008: 28%). We independently calculated the difference estimator for the concession
and no-concession sub-samples by separately interacting each with the period variable.
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Table 1 provides a descriptive breakdown and correlation table for the aforementioned
treatment sub-samples. The low correlations between these variables provide evidence that each
of our proposed moderating mechanisms describes a discrete sub-sample of treated firms.
[Insert Table 1 Here]

Control Variables
Across all models, we include a battery of control variables that previous research
demonstrates are associated with corporate political activity. In all models predicting the
proportion of refunded contributions, we include a control for the logged total PAC contributions
in the same quarter. To account for systematic temporal patterns in giving as a result of election
cycles, we include year and quarter fixed effects, as well as a separate control for the quarter
just prior to an election, when we would expect contributions to spike and politicians to be more
reluctant to refund contributions. To capture differences in the extent of firms’ relationships with
regulators, we include a binary variable that captures whether a firm operates in a regulated
industry, using the classification by two-digit SIC code provided in prior work (Weiss & Klass,
1986; Danos & Eichenseher, 1982; Hogan & Jeter, 1999). To account for likely differences in
the proclivity of disparate political parties to refund contributions, we include a variable –
company political alignment – that is equal to the difference between the total contributions
made to Republicans and Democrats, divided by the total contributions. This variable ranges
from 1 to -1, with firms that only gave to Republican candidates receiving a score of 1 and firms
that only gave to Democratic candidates receiving a score of -1. We control for firm
performance by including return on equity (ROE). Given that, as described above, the number of
contributors to a firm’s PAC correlates with its total number of employees, we include the
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logged number of employees as our general proxy for corporate size. Each of the corporate
political alignment, ROE, and logged number of employees variables is lagged one quarter to
allow for better causal estimation. To capture differences in baseline reputation, we include the
raw score for each firm in annual Fortune ‘Most Admired’ rankings, which range from 0-10.
Following the assumption that politicians are less likely to have solid information about the
reputation of firms that do not appear in the ‘Most Admired’ rankings, we assign all firms that
are not included in the rankings a reputation score of 0. Finally, because firms whose primary
operations are in different states are likely to face very different state-level electoral pressures in
a given election cycle, we include a fixed effect for the state in which each firm is headquartered.
Descriptive statistics for and correlations between the control variables used in our
analyses are provided in Table 2 below.
[Insert Table 2 Here]
In an ideal matched sample, control firms are identical to treated firms in all relevant pretreatment characteristics (Heckman, Ichimura, & Todd, 1998). To probe the adequacy of our
matched sample, Table 3 provides descriptive statistics comparing the treatment sample to the
matched sample across all pre-treatment explanatory and control variables utilized in our models.
T-tests for differences in means were run between the groups on all variables. As shown in the
final column of Table 3, these t-tests confirmed that the treatment sample does not significantly
differ from the matched sample on any of these variables. Our sample of boycotted firms is
marginally significantly larger in terms of its number of employees (p = .08), but our models are
not affected by controlling for this variable. These results lend credence to the matched sample’s
adequacy as a reliable comparison group for purposes of our difference-in-differences analyses.
[Insert Table 3 Here]
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Results
Models testing hypotheses 1 and 2 are shown in Table 4, below. Model 1 tests for
changes in sample firms’ overall PAC contributions. The control variables in model 1 further
indicate that firms give higher contributions in general when they operate in regulated industries,
occupy a higher status, lean more toward a conservative political alignment, and have more
employees. Additionally, H1 is supported by the model: The difference estimator is negative and
statistically significant, suggesting that boycotted firms did indeed reduce their amounts of PAC
contributions in the post-boycott period, relative to the matched sample.
Model 2 tests for changes in the proportion of PAC contributions that were refunded to
sample firms by the recipient politicians. Here, the control variables indicate that firms have
higher amounts refunded when they are larger and give more money overall. Additionally, the
corporate political alignment variable in this model is negative and significant. This suggests
that, as might be expected in light of the pro-business orientation of the Republican Party, firms
have a smaller proportion of contributions refunded when they give more to conservative
candidates. The difference estimator in model 2 is positive and significant, providing evidence
that boycotted firms did have a larger increase in the amounts of refunded contributions in the
post-boycott period, relative to the matched firms. Thus, H2 is supported by the model.
Interestingly, the period variable in model 2 is verging on significance, providing some
indication that the non-boycotted firms in our sample may actually enjoy a decrease in the
amount of refunded contributions over time.
[Insert Table 4 Here]
To assist with the interpretation of the refund results, Figure 1 provides a bar graph of the
pre- to post-treatment proportions in refunded contributions for the boycotted firms and the
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matched sample. As can be seen in the graph, the treatment sample receives significantly higher
refunds than the control sample in the quarter following the boycott. The non-boycotted firms
actually enjoy a decrease in the amount of refunded contributions, consistent with the decreasing
trends in refunds over time that one would expect in light of the increasing campaign
expenditures more generally.
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
As discussed above, our estimated effect derived from this difference-in-difference
analysis is limited to the quarter just after the boycott. This modeling choice likely leads to a
conservative estimate, as we ignore both that portion of the cumulative effect that occurs in the
quarter of the boycott, as well as the possibility that the effect is felt by firms for more than one
quarter after the boycott. We probe this possibility in Figure 2, below, where we highlight the
trends in the proportion of total PAC contributions that were refunded.3 The figure plots the
mean proportion of PAC contributions refunded for both our treatment and control groups (once
we stack them in time around their boycotted quarter) from four quarters prior to the boycott to
four quarters after it. Two key points stand out: first, the trends across the two groups are
roughly parallel in the pre-boycott period, satisfying the key assumption of our difference-indifferences design that trends in our dependent variable do not significantly differ between the
treatment and control groups in the absence of the treatment. Second, the gap that opens during
the boycott quarter and remains open (if narrowing) afterward provides suggestive evidence that
the effect endures beyond the immediate quarter following the boycott.
[Insert Figure 2 Here]

3

Pre- and post-treatment trends for the average total PAC contributions (logged) are similar in that they are parallel
across our treatment and control groups pre-boycott, and a gap between these groups opens during and remains after
the quarter of the boycott. We plot the proportion refunded for space concerns and also due to our use of it in tests of
H2 and all parts of H3, H4, and H5.
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Models of our proposed boycott-specific mechanisms moderating the extent of a
boycott’s nonmarket disruption (H3a-3c) are provided in table 5. Model 1 tests whether boycotts
that receive more media attention are likely to experience higher levels of disruption (H3a).
Here, we find that the difference estimator for boycotts that receive higher levels of media
attention is positive and significant, suggesting that firms that are targeted by boycotts receiving
two or more articles in the mainstream press experience an increase of about 3.39% in the
amount of their political contributions that were refunded in the quarter after the boycott. The
difference estimator for boycotts that receive less media attention is, on the contrary, not
significantly different from 0. This provides support for our hypothesis 3a by indicating that
boycotts that present more of a reputational threat are more likely to lead to significant disruption
of a targeted firm’s non-market strategy.
Model 2 of Table 5 tests H3b, suggesting that boycotts that challenge issues that are
recognized as more salient or important to the public are more likely to provoke higher levels of
disruption in their targeted firms. This hypothesis receives support in the model. The difference
estimator for boycotts that waged issues listed in Gallup’s ‘Most Important Problem’ poll is
significant and positive, suggesting that firms targeted by these boycotts experienced around a
2.12% increase in the amount of their political contributions that was refunded in the quarter
after the boycott. The difference estimator for firms targeted by boycotts waging issues that
were not listed in the Gallup poll is not significantly different from 0.
Model 3 of Table 5 tests our final boycott-specific moderating mechanism (H3c), which
suggests that boycotts that target a parent company (rather than a subsidiary or single brand) will
be more likely to provoke non-market disruption for the targeted firm. Here, we find that the
difference estimator for the boycotts targeting a parent company is positive and significant,
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indicating that parent companies targeted directly by boycotts suffered around a 2.00% increase
in the amount of their political campaign contributions that was refunded in the quarter after the
boycott, relative to other firms. Boycotts targeting a subsidiary or brand did not provoke a
significant increase in the amount of contributions refunded to their targets.
[Insert Table 5 Here]
Table 6 provides the results for our final set of models testing the target-specific
mechanisms of disruption (H4a-b), as well as the moderating power of post-boycott strategies
employed by the targeted firm (H5a-b). Model 1 of Table 6 tests whether low-status firms are
likely to suffer higher levels of non-market disruption when targeted (H4a). The model supports
this hypothesis. The difference estimator suggests that low status boycotts experience around a
2.94% increase in the amount of their refunded contributions in the quarter after the boycott (p <
.01). The difference estimator for firms higher status firms is, however, not significantly
different from zero.
Model 5 tests H4b that firms operating in unregulated industries will experience higher
levels of disruption as a result of being boycotted, in the form of increased refunded political
contributions. Here, we find that boycotts in unregulated industries experience a significant
(roughly 1.81%) increase of refunded contributions in the quarter after the boycott, relative to
other firms. To the contrary, we find no evidence of a significant increase in refunded
contributions for the boycott targets that operate in regulated industries. Thus, H4b is supported
in the model.
Hypothesis 5a argues that firms that fail to engage in post-boycott impression
management will experience higher levels of disruption when targeted by a boycott. Model 6
tests this hypothesis. Here, we find that boycotts of firms with low post-threat impression
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management see a significant increase in refunded contributions. Targets in this category
experienced around a 2.11% increase in their refunded contributions, relative to other firms (p <
.05). The difference estimator for firms that engaged in post-boycott impression management is
not significant, suggesting that firms that actively made pro-social claims in the wake of a
boycott were no more likely than their matched firms to experience refunded contributions.
Finally, Model 7 of Table 6 tests our hypothesis that firms that do not concede to a
boycott are more likely to experience nonmarket disruption (H5b). The models do not support
this hypothesis. The difference estimator for non-conceding firms is not significant, suggesting
that these targets that did not concede to a boycott were no more likely than the control firms to
experience increased refunded political campaign contributions. Interestingly, the difference
estimator for targets that did concede to a boycott is positive and verging on significance,
providing some indication that firms that do concede to a boycott may be more likely to
experience nonmarket disruption in the form of refunded campaign contributions. This finding
provides support to claims made in prior work that concession may lead to higher levels of
reputational risk by recognizing and validating the activists’ disparaging claims (McDonnell &
King, 2013), whereas a more indirect tactics, such as making a pro-social claim, does not.
[Insert Table 6 Here]

Discussion and Conclusion
Our paper contributes most directly to two active streams of research: social movement
theory and non-market strategy. We contribute to social movement research by exploring the
manner in which social movement challenges disrupt corporate non-market strategy. Our study
provides evidence that the political arena offers an unexplored dimension through which
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contentious activists gain leverage over their corporate targets. Principally, by increasing the risk
that guilt by association may harm political actors through the use of boycotts, activists impede
their targets’ access to and thus influence over regulatory and political stakeholders. We
articulate and find evidence for two different mechanisms through which these constraints occur.
First, firms self-constrain their behavior: the average boycotted firm-connected PAC reduces its
contributions by approximately 1.6% in the quarter after they are boycotted. We hypothesize
that this behavior is driven both by a lack of willing recipients, as well as an acknowledgement
by a firm’s management that its contributions may do more harm than good to candidates it
supports. Second, we also find that politicians increasingly reject contributions from
controversial firms, with the average boycotted firm seeing the proportion of its contributions
that are refunded increase by 0.016, which, on average, represents a doubling of this amount.
Although the magnitude of these effects may appear relatively small, the boycotts from
which they stem are not purposively focused on constraining firms’ non-market practices but
rather on altering other practices of the target firms. Thus, the substantive impact of our findings
are best interpreted as lower bounds or conservative estimates of the effects of social movements
on political contributions and non-market strategy more broadly. If social movement activists
targeted firms specifically for their prior engagement in electoral politics, then we would expect
the magnitude of boycotts’ effects to be substantially greater.
In addition to providing evidence for the disruptive potential of contentious challenges,
we also examine characteristics of the boycotts and impacted firms that might enhance or
ameliorate the threat of disruption, such as media attention and impression management. These
investigations extend the work of economic sociologists who have previously pointed to the
importance of considering the complex social systems in which firms are embedded as an
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important predictor of corporate political activity (e.g., Mizruchi & Koenig, 1986; Mizruchi,
1989; Burris, 2005). Boycotts are more likely to cause disruption when they attract more media
attention, target their locus of attack at the parent-firm level, and protest more salient issues.
Firm-level characteristics that positively moderate disruption include possessing a high-status
and operating in an unregulated industry. Finally, we provide evidence that disruption is more
likely to occur when targeted firms fail to engage in defensive impression management in the
wake of a boycott, consistent with McDonnell and King’s (2013) claim that post-boycott
impression management operates to reduce reputational damage.
This paper also contributes to existing non-market strategy research by exploring how the
contentiousness of a firm’s stakeholder environment can constrain the tactics firms may employ.
The findings additionally have broader implications for our understanding of the power of
business as a political actor. First, we find that social movement challenges can disrupt the
availability of mainstream corporate political strategies, in effect making non-market strategy
less attractive for firms (Bonardi et al., 2005; Oliver & Holzinger, 2008), especially when
considered as a substitute for market strategy, which has previously been shown as subject to
similar disruptions. Any limitation on firms’ ability to engage in electoral politics has a
subsequent effect of their ability to help shape which individuals hold office, which political
party gains majority status, and thus, which set of political actors controls the policy agenda and
policy outcomes. Further, by specifically constraining direct contributions from firms’ affiliated
PACs to individual candidates, activists leave firms with only one other tactical option for
engaging in electoral politics – independent expenditures – that cannot be coordinated with the
candidate, are unproven in their effectiveness, and have been subject to heavy criticism since
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being allowed in an unlimited and potentially undisclosed fashion by Citizens United, which was
decided in 2010, three years after our sample period ends.
Second, our findings reveal an important, if small and temporary, limit on the
instrumental power of business (Lindblom, 1977). As a result of this limitation, firms may have
to adjust their non-market strategies either by relying to a greater degree on their structural (e.g.,
Lindblom, 1982; Block, 1977) or persuasive powers (Smith, 2007) or by putting a greater
emphasis on other political instruments/tactics that have proven successful for them, such as
regulatory and legislative lobbying (Baumgartner et al., 2009) or grassroots mobilization
(Walker, 2014). Of course, these other instruments, unlike electoral politics, aim largely not to
influence whom holds office and thus controls the policy agenda but rather to persuade those in
already in office or to affect policy change directly through initiatives or referenda.
Finally, in bringing together social movement theory and non-market strategy, we
contribute to the broader search for institutional variants that help to explain differences in
corporate political behaviors (Hillman & Keim, 1995; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Bonardi et al.,
2005; Macher et al., 2011; Weymouth, 2012). The extent to which activists disrupt a
corporation’s political strategy may also carry over to a firm’s market performance, insofar as
higher political contributions or tighter political connections lead to outperforming stock returns
and survival benefits (e.g., Carroll, Delacroix, & Goodstein, 1988; Hannan & Freeman, 1977;
Burt, 1992; Getz, 1997; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Hillman, 2005; Gulen, Cooper &
Ovtchinnikov, 2010; Hadani & Schuler, 2012). Thus, the process explored here has potentially
far-reaching strategic implications for firms that operate in contentious social environments.
There are two key limitations to this paper that deserve future study. First, although we
document that social movement-led boycotts constrain firms’ political contributions, we do not
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examine whether or how firms adjust their non-market strategies as a result of market contention.
For example, within the realm of electoral politics, as we discussed earlier, firms may shift from
making PAC contributions to making independent expenditures. Additionally, other individual
actors connected to a firm, such as its top management team, may adjust their personal giving
strategies in service of a firm when its PAC is constrained (e.g., Richter & Werner, 2013). Firms
may alternatively shift from electoral non-market strategies to informational strategies focused
on the provision of politically and policy relevant information via lobbying, or they may seek to
develop connections to policymakers by employing their former colleagues or staff members.
The second limitation relates to the first in that should firms adapt their strategies to take
advantage of the loopholes in disclosure created by Citizens United, then those firms targeted by
social movement activists may still be able to engage in electoral politics without tainting their
allies via guilt by association. Of course, for this strategy to work, firms will have to find a way
to communicate discreetly that they supported a politician in this manner without violating the
legal prohibition on coordination between candidates and those making independent
expenditures on their behalf. We note, however, that existing political science research (e.g.,
Hamm et al., 2012; Werner & Coleman, 2014) provides little evidence to suggest that businesses
either engage in independent expenditures at significant rates or do so other than in a manner that
is contrary to shareholders’ interests.
By viewing corporate political activity through the lens of organizational theory and
social movement theory, we see this project as an answer to Walker and Rea’s (2014) recent call
for the reinvigoration of sociological inquiry into the study of corporate power and influence.
More significantly, we see this study as drawing together two fields that should be in
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conversation with one another, given the rapidly growing importance of external stakeholders to
firms’ market and non-market strategies.
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Figure 1: Refunded Contributions Before and After a Boycott Announcement
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Figure 2: Quarterly Proportion of PAC Contributions Refunded Around Corporate Boycotts
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Treatment Sub-Categories
1 Boycott: More Media Attention
2 Boycott: More Claim Legitimacy
3 Boycott: Parent Company
4 Boycott: High Status
5 Boycott: Unregulated Industry
6 Boycott: Low Impression Management
7 Boycott: Concession

Mean
0.280
0.645
0.665
0.793
0.429
0.227
0.226

S.D. Min Max
0.450 0
1
0.479 0
1
0.473 0
1
0.476 0
1
0.406 0
1
0.496 0
1
0.420 0
1

1

2

3

4

0.2121
0.0383
0.0657
0.1285
0.1383
0.3064

0.1006
0.0618
-0.0282
-0.0058
0.0364

0.0865
-0.2299
0.0681
-0.0519

-0.1882
0.3449
-0.0116

5

6

0.0102
0.0626 0.0762

Table 2: Summary Statistics and Correlations
Variable
Mean
Min
Max
SD
1 Total PAC Contributions
25,686.66
-5,500 413,000 47,211.29
2 Refund Proportion
0.022
0
0.875
0.0767
3 Regulated Industry
0.203
0
1
0.402
4 Reputation
4.464
0
8.83
3.363
5 Corporate Political Alignment
0.208
-1
1
0.751
6 ROE
0.00543 -12.039
4.798
0.557
7 Logged Employees
3.841
-4.71
7.649
1.604

1
2
3
4
5
6
1.00
0.056
1
0.014 0.025
1
0.277 0.084 0.057
1
0.045 -0.077 0.088 0.105
1
0.034 0.022 0.062 0.073 0.029
1
0.335
0.11 -0.037 0.406 0.129 0.026
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Table 3: Comparison of Pre-Treatment Variables for Treatment and Matched Samples
Pre-Treatment Variable
Total PAC Contributions
Proportion Refunded
Reputation
Corp. Political Alignment
ROE
Logged Employees
Logged Assets

Treatment Sample
Mean
SD
24323.35
46070.17
0.022
0.085
4.54
3.39
0.167
0.771
0.186
0.192
3.976
1.49
9.442
1.793

Matched Sample
Mean
SD
26000.05
47047.87
0.025
0.08
4.38
3.33
0.192
0.736
0.215
0.207
3.695
1.72
9.163
1.692

T-test
0.71
0.73
0.63
0.74
0.88
0.08
0.11
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Table 4: Difference-in-Differences Models Exploring the Effect of Being Boycotted on Political
Campaign Contributions
Model 1:
Logged PAC
Contributions

Model 2:
Proportion Refunded

Treatment: Boycott

-0.754
(0.493)

-0.00448
(0.006)

Period

0.269
(0.178)

-0.00866+
(0.005)

Difference Estimator
(Treatment x Period)

-0.500*
(0.245)

0.0161*
(0.008)

Variables

Controls
Regulated Industry

2.083**
(0.708)
Reputation
0.181*
(0.088)
Corporate Political Alignment 0.728**
(0.258)
ROE
0.0095
(0.209)
Logged Employees
1.353***
(0.179)
Log Total PAC Contributions

0.00495
(0.005)
-0.000537
(0.001)
-0.0120**
(0.004)
0.00145
(0.002)
0.00308*
(0.001)
0.00246***
(0.001)

Year Fixed Effects
Quarter Fixed Effects
State Fixed Effects

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

Constant

0.887
(1.634)

-0.0193+
(0.010)

N

812

812

+ p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
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Table 5: Models Exploring Boycott-Specific Mechanisms of Nonmarket Disruption

Variables
Boycott: More Media Attention
Boycott: Less Media Attention
Dif: Boycott More Media Attention
Dif: Boycott Less Media Attention

Model 1:
Media Attention

Model 2:
Issue Salience

-0.00874
(0.007)
-0.00399
(0.006)
0.0339*
(0.014)
0.0112
(0.007)

Boycott: Higher Issue Salience

-0.0022
(0.007)
-0.0081
(0.007)
0.0212*
(0.010)
0.00655
(0.007)

Boycott: Lower Issue Salience
Dif: Boycott Higher Issue Salience
Dif: Lower Issue Salience

Boycott: Targeted a Main Company

-0.00426
(0.006)
-0.00483
(0.007)
0.0200*
(0.008)
0.00816
(0.010)

Boycott: Targeted a Subsidiary
Dif: Boycott of Parent Company
Dif: Boycott of Subsidiary/Brand

Period

Model 3:
Locus of Attack
(Parent/Subsidiary)

-0.0067
(0.004)

-0.00865+
(0.005)

-0.00854+
(0.005)

Continued on Next Page
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Table 5, continued
Controls
Logged Total PAC Contributions

0.00240***
(0.001)
-0.00965
(0.009)
0.00524
(0.005)
-0.000562
(0.001)
-0.0119**
(0.004)
0.00124
(0.002)
0.00317*
(0.001)

0.00229***
(0.001)
-0.0096
(0.008)
0.00473
(0.005)
-0.000523
(0.001)
-0.0121**
(0.004)
0.00095
(0.002)
0.00321*
(0.001)

0.00239***
(0.001)
-0.00877
(0.008)
0.00421
(0.005)
-0.000539
(0.001)
-0.0120**
(0.004)
0.00158
(0.002)
0.00303*
(0.001)

Year Fixed Effects
State Fixed Effects
Quarter Fixed Effects

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Constant

-0.0175+
(0.010)

-0.0207*
(0.010)

-0.0201*
(0.010)

N

812

812

812

Quarter Prior to an Election
Regulated Industry
Reputation
Corporate Political Alignment
ROE
Logged Employees

+ p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
Note: Dependent variable is the proportion of contributions refunded
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Table 6: Models Exploring Target-Specific Mechanisms of Nonmarket Disruption
Model 4:
Status
Boycott: High Status
Boycott: Low Status
Dif: Boycott High Status
Dif: Boycott Low Status

Boycott: Regulated Industry
Boycott: Unregulated Industry
Dif: Boycott Regulated Industry
Dif: Boycott Unregulated Industry

Boycott: High Impression Mgmt
Boycott: Low Impression Mgmt
Dif: Boycott High Impression Mgmt
Dif: Boycott Low Impression Mgmt

Boycott: Concession
Boycott: No Concession
Dif: Boycott Concession
Dif: Boycott No Concession

Model 5:
Model 6:
Industry Reg. Imp. Mgmt

Model 7:
Concession

-0.00237
(0.006)
-0.00901
(0.006)
0.00929
(0.009)
0.0294**
(0.010)
-0.00729
(0.009)
-0.00386
(0.006)
0.00839
(0.009)
0.0181*
(0.009)
0.00371
(0.008)
-0.0104+
(0.005)
0.0121
(0.010)
0.0211*
(0.009)
0.00808
(0.006)
-0.00229
(0.006)
0.0241+
(0.012)
0.00839
(0.007)

Continued on Next Page
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Table 6, continued
Period

-0.00853+
(0.005)

-0.00865+
(0.005)

-0.00833*
(0.004)

-0.00522
(0.004)

0.00240***
(0.001)
-0.00843
(0.008)
0.00546
(0.005)
-0.0120**
(0.004)
0.00161
(0.002)
0.00292*
(0.001)

0.00244***
(0.001)
-0.00897
(0.008)
0.00902
(0.007)
-0.0120**
(0.004)
0.0016
(0.002)
0.00317*
(0.001)
-0.000437
(0.001)

0.00243***
(0.001)
-0.00919
(0.009)
0.0051
(0.005)
-0.0120**
(0.004)
0.00147
(0.002)
0.00278*
(0.001)
-0.000697
(0.001)

0.00245***
(0.001)
-0.00905
(0.009)
0.00525
(0.005)
-0.0118**
(0.004)
0.00101
(0.002)
0.00279*
(0.001)
-0.000546
(0.001)

Year Fixed Effects
Quarter Fixed Effects
State Fixed Effects

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Constant

-0.0235*
(0.009)

-0.0210*
(0.010)

-0.0230*
(0.010)

-0.0179+
(0.010)

N

812

812

812

812

Controls
Logged Total PAC Contributions
Quarter Prior to an Election
Regulated Industry
Company Political Aligment
ROE
Logged Employees
Reputation

+ p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
Note: Dependent variable is the proportion of contributions refunded
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